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Most researchers in statistics, biomedical, and social sciences hold in high esteem the random 
allocation of subjects to experimental groups for causal inference. But some philosophers of 
science have challenged the arguments usually provided for randomization, to the point 
where they consider randomization as, “for the most part, … a waste of effort and resources” 
(Urbach 1985, 258). Their arguments have been—and remain—influential. Now that 
important policy movements are downplaying the role of randomized studies for treatment 
approval (e.g., the 21st Century Cures Act in the US), the time is ripe for reassessing their 
arguments. 
Some arguments for randomization—e.g., that it “guarantees” strict comparability between 
experimental groups—are clearly exaggerations. The most trenchant criticisms of 
randomization, by Peter Urbach (1985; Howson and Urbach 2006) and John Worrall (2002, 
2007), provide both good compilations of these claims and sound arguments against them. 
However, I contend, Urbach and Worrall’s conclusion—that there is no reason to 
randomize—is incorrect. 
Importantly, my arguments do not assume the frequentist approach to statistical inference. 
Like Urbach and Worrall, I focus mainly on the balance between experimental groups. 
Although the focus is specifically on experimental design, the framework for assessing 
baseline balance presented below has two further payoffs. It rationalizes practitioners’ strong 
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preference for randomized studies in some cases, while still offering a nuanced approach to 
evidence appraisal. 
I start by restating the problem of causal attribution (2). I then clarify where the substantive 
disagreement lies between the (more reasonable positions among) practitioners and the critics 
of randomization (3). Urbach and Worrall’s main arguments are discussed in sections (4) and 
(5), where I show they do not entail that there is no epistemic value in randomizing. Sections 
(6) and (7) provide novel epistemic and non-epistemic reasons to randomize in the context of 
interventional studies. 
2. The Problem. 
Randomized studies are taken to be a solution to the problem of determining the causal 
impact that one variable (sometimes called “independent”) has on another variable 
(“outcome” or “dependent”) within a study population. Here the causal impact of a variable 
is understood as the difference that it makes on a specific outcome in the study population.1 
Using a simplified example will prove helpful. In the simplest (but common) case, the 
independent variable of interest (T) is dichotomous. When researchers observe, in a given 
                                                        
1 The program evaluation literature defines causal effects using Donald Rubin’s potential 
outcomes model (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009). Here I follow Deaton and Cartwright’s 
(2018, 3) more neutral presentation. 
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study population, a difference in the outcome of interest between those for whom T=1 (the 
“treatment” group) and those for whom T=0 (the “control” group), that difference may be 
attributed to the causal impact of T and/or to the causal impact of other variable(s). Imagine a 
researcher interested in the impact that some job training programs (T) have on labor market 
outcomes (Y), typically wages or employment-status. Labor market outcomes are related to 
many variables, such as education (schooling), work experience, gender, and family 
networks. Let us formalize these relations with a simple linear model: 𝑌" = 𝛽𝑇" + 𝑿′"𝜸. 
Subscript i refers to the individual, T to attending (or not) a job training program, and 𝛽 to 
the impact of T on Y.2 Vectors X and 𝜸 refer, respectively, to all the minimally sufficient 
factors (apart from T) that affect labor market outcomes and their respective impact on them. 
Factors in X are called “covariates” (Deaton and Cartwright 2018), “prognostic factors” 
(Urbach 1985), or “potential confounders” (Fuller 2019).3  
                                                        
2 If T has no impact, 𝛽 = 0. 
3 I’m simplifying here. First, I’m assuming that the impact of T on Y is the same for all subjects 
(𝛽"=	𝛽 for all i). I’m also glossing over Fuller’s (2019) distinction between potential 
confounders that are “directly causal” and those that are “associational-causal.” Finally, as 
said, the factors in X are minimally sufficient causes in the study population, unlike Fuller’s 
(2019) “confounders,” which are only components of sufficient causes. None of these 
subtleties affect my arguments below. 
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Imagine our researcher is looking at labor market outcomes of participants and non-
participants of a job training program in an area of India. She observes that the average 
income of participants is higher than that of non-participants (i.e., 𝐸(𝑌"|𝑇 = 1) >
𝐸(𝑌"|𝑇 = 0)).4 Is she warranted in attributing the observed difference to the causal impact of 
T? Not if she suspects that those who participated differ in other variables that also affect 
income (e.g., education). Imagine participants have higher education, but do not differ in 
other variables of X (age, gender, etc.). If our researcher does not have data on education, she 
cannot control for that variable. In econometric jargon, she faces an “omitted variable bias” 
problem. This is just another way of saying that the two groups the researcher is observing 
are not “balanced” or “matched” with respect to covariates. 
3. The Disagreements. 
Both Urbach’s (1985, Howson and Urbach 2006) and Worrall’s (2002, 2007) discussions 
largely focus on the value of randomly5 assigning subjects for attributing causation. Thus, 
                                                        
4 𝐸(•) refers to the expectation in the study population (i.e., the average in the observed data). 
5 Here, “randomly assign” means assigning by a procedure taken to be random by practitioners. 
In general, there are two categories. First, when the randomization is done at the researchers’ 
offices, it is done by using “random numbers” generated by a software. Second, when the 
randomization is done in the field, it is done by using physical randomization procedures like 
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their focus is on what I call “simple randomization,” in contrast to “stratified randomization” 
(discussed below). The problem they raise for simple randomization is that in any given trial, 
we might just be “unlucky,” and get imbalanced groups with respect to some covariate. Their 
response: instead of randomizing, researchers should control for all suspected covariates. In 
our running example, the researcher should assemble groups that are balanced regarding each 
covariate in X. If what threatens the causal inference is imbalance in covariates, these authors 
ask, why prefer to assemble groups by a chancy method versus by deliberately matching the 
covariates? 
Many practitioners, at least in the social sciences, would look at this discussion with surprise. 
For one, it is not news that a random assignment can produce baseline imbalance, especially 
in small samples (see Senn 2013; Deaton and Cartwright 2018). More importantly, 
practitioners take for granted that if we could control for all covariates there would be no 
problem of causal inference. Thus no need to randomize. But we are never, or almost never, 
in possession of a database with all covariates. The list of variables included in X is very 
long—many factors affect the typical outcomes we are interested in. Of course, some of them 
might be unknown to us. But, even if we know what all the covariates are, there are some of 
which we are almost never in possession. A stock example: Wages are affected by schooling, 
                                                        
drawing balls from urns. Neither Urbach nor Worrall provide a definition of randomization, 
but this is probably what they have in mind. 
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work experience, gender, and other variables researchers usually have access to; but also by 
harder-to-measure and usually-unavailable variables such as subjects’ “ability”, 
“motivation,” and “family connections” (Blackburn and Neumark 1995). So the proposed 
solution is not feasible—researchers do not have all suspected covariates available to control 
for. 
What advocates of randomization have in mind, at least in economics and in the program 
evaluation literature more generally, is stratified (or blocking) randomization. This involves 
forming groups based on observed covariates and then randomly assigning participants to 
treatment within these groups.6 Doing so effectively controls for observed covariates before 
randomization, which amounts to applying Urbach and Worrall’s proposed solution to the 
extent possible, and then randomizing. 
Why have Urbach and Worrall focused largely on the distinction between simple 
randomization and controlling for all covariates (that is, between the undesirable and the 
                                                        
6 Bruhn and McKenzie’s (2009) survey article shows that most researchers in development 
economics use stratified (not simple) randomization. The recently published Handbook of 
Field Experiments also recommends stratified randomization (Duflo and Banerjee 2017, 76). 
An alternative practice to stratification, re-randomization, also secures balance in observed 




unfeasible)? Worrall explicitly recognizes the alternative strategy of stratified randomization, 
but clarifies he focuses on simple randomization because that is “what most commentators 
have in mind in assessing the power of the methodology” (2007, 452 fn. 1). This is not, as I 
have suggested, what most social science researchers have as standard practice. Perhaps 
Worrall’s focus on the medical literature played a role here.7 Urbach seems to think that 
controlling for all likely covariates is a feasible option. This seems to me the only way to 
understand Urbach’s (striking) remark that the situation in which there are “certain factors 
…believed to have an influence on the experimental outcome but [for which] we possess no 
means whatsoever to detect their presence, however crudely” is “a rather unusual situation” 
(1985, 267). This optimism seems as unwarranted in medicine as in the social sciences 
(Deaton and Cartwright 2018). 
Alas, the previous discussion does not resolve all disagreement between Urbach & Worrall 
on the one hand, and practitioners on the other. It does, however, help us situate more 
precisely the specific disagreement regarding experimental design:  
                                                        
7 See (Worrall 2002, S323 fn. 6). Moreover, stratification and re-randomization are not feasible 
when the recruitment of subjects overlaps in time with randomization (as is not uncommon in 
medical trials). Thanks to a referee for this point. 
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(D) In an interventional study, after having controlled for the observed covariates 
(e.g., by stratifying), is there any (pro tanto) specific reason to randomize (i.e., one 
that is not already a reason for some other allocation method)? 
Against practitioners, Urbach and Worrall argue that, after controlling for observed 
covariates, there is no special value in randomization for producing baseline balance. 
(Randomizing can do “no further epistemic good,” says Worrall 2007, 463.) Given that they 
do not see any other reason at stake, faced with (D) they conclude, in Worrall’s words, 
“there’s no cause to randomize.” Before assessing their arguments, I clarify some aspects of 
(D). 
Note that (D) is about experimental design. It takes as given that we are in the context of an 
interventional study (i.e., a prospective trial where the researcher has control over the method 
of subjects’ assignment to experimental groups). Moreover, in (D) the focus is on the balance 
of unobserved covariates, since the observed covariates are controlled. 
I emphasize that question (D) is different from questions such as: 
(D’): Are randomized studies (always, or in general) better for causal inference than 
observational studies?  
(D’’): Should we conduct a randomized trial to answer question X?  
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(D) versus (D’). The quality of a study depends on several factors besides baseline balance 
(e.g., the representativeness and size of the study population, the measuring instruments, 
blinding procedures, statistical analyses, etc.) Therefore, categorical rankings (“evidence 
hierarchies”) constructed considering only one dimension—namely, whether the study is 
randomized or not—are poor tools for assessing the overall quality of studies. Better tools—
called “quality assessment tools” by Stegenga (2018, 76)—assess studies taking into account 
all the relevant factors. Which factors are relevant depends on the specific causal question at 
stake (Deaton and Cartwright 2018). Thus, a positive answer in (D) does not entail a positive 
answer in (D’). 
(D) versus (D’’). Clearly, to decide to conduct an interventional study (regardless whether 
group assignment is random or not) requires considering not only the several quality-of-
evidence aspects just mentioned besides balance, but also non-epistemic (ethical and 
financial) considerations. Withholding treatment to patients may be unethical, and 
interventional studies may be costlier than alternatives. So, a positive answer in (D) does not 
entail a positive answer in (D’’). 
Crucially, these further epistemic and non-epistemic considerations do not bear on (D). The 
non-epistemic considerations mentioned are pertinent for the decision of conducting an 
interventional study (versus using data already available for an observational study). But 
once this decision has been taken, and we ask how to allocate subjects to experimental 
groups, those considerations no longer make a difference—they apply equally to randomized 
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and non-randomized interventional studies.8 The same is true regarding the further epistemic 
considerations: assigning randomly (versus not) does not affect the other quality-of-evidence 
factors already mentioned. 
Nonetheless, (D) is not just an important question about scientific methodology. Although an 
answer to (D) neither fully settles the evidence-appraisal question (D’), nor the pragmatic 
question (D’’), it plays an important role in answering them. To see this, note that all current 
quality assessment tools give a positive value to randomization, varying in the weight given 
to this factor (see Stegenga 2018). But what justifies this positive value? A claim like “ceteris 
paribus randomization is better for baseline balance” would justify this positive value. 
Urbach and Worrall reject this claim, and I will defend it while arguing for a positive answer 
to question (D). In this sense, this paper’s conclusion is not only relevant for the 
experimental design question. Moreover, thorough consideration of (D) will reward us with a 
unified framework for assessing the expected baseline balance of both interventional and 
observational studies.  
4. The Non-Comparative Argument. 
                                                        
8 For example, moral reasons against giving only a placebo to the control group hold (or not) 
independently of whether its membership is allocated randomly or by another method. 
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Urbach and Worrall provide two major arguments against any special benefit accruing from 
randomization—one non-comparative and the other comparative. The non-comparative 
argument aims at challenging directly what they take to be the best reason for randomization: 
that randomization makes imbalance in unobserved covariates unlikely.9 The idea is that any 
randomly generated variable is not systematically (i.e., in general, in the overall population) 
correlated to Y’s covariates.10 That is, if we randomly assign members of the population as a 
whole to two groups, the groups will not differ in Y’s covariates. So, the idea goes, it is 
unlikely for this correlation to appear in our specific study population (see Worrall 2002, 
S323).  
Worrall (2002) acknowledges that the larger the trial, the less likely it is that a given 
unobserved covariate is unbalanced under randomization. This, however, can only support 
the claim that randomizing (in large studies) makes significant imbalance unlikely in any 
given unobserved covariate. But this is not sufficient to defend randomizing, since the real 
question for inferring causation in a given trial seems to be whether there is balance in all 
unobserved covariates. And as Urbach (Howson and Urbach 2006, 195-6) and Worrall 
(2002, S323-4) say, there might be “innumerable” unobserved covariates. So, the probability 
                                                        
9 Another main reason they discuss relates to selection bias (see section 5). 
10 Variables such as, say, “education,” “motivation,” “ability,” etc., do not share common 
causes with (nor cause or are caused by) the randomly generated variable. 
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that by pure bad luck, after randomizing in a given trial, there is imbalance in some 
unobserved covariate or other may, for all we know, be quite high. 
Now, pointing out that (even) with random assignment there is a non-negligible possibility of 
imbalance in some unobserved covariate does not constitute a reason against randomizing. 
For all we know, this possibility is equally (or more likely!) present in any alternative non-
random assignment mechanism yet to be proposed. At least, nothing has been said to the 
contrary. Nevertheless, their argument undercuts the positive reason for randomizing under 
consideration, namely, that imbalance is unlikely if we randomize. So, their conclusion does 
not entail randomization is on a par with non-randomization (recall, in the context of (D)), 
but it is pertinent to our question because it undercuts a positive reason for positioning 
randomization above non-randomization. 
Urbach and Worrall are correct to reject the claim that randomization makes the probability 
that there is imbalance in some unobserved covariate or other small. However, this entails a 
threat to internal validity (i.e., whether we can attribute causation within the study 
population) only if we assume that all covariates need to be balanced for warranting a causal 
attribution. Fortunately, the condition for sound causal attribution in our context is not as 
strict. Look at the difference in means of the experimental groups: 
(1)               𝐸(𝑌"|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌"|𝑇 = 0) 	= 𝐸(	𝛽𝑇" + 𝑿4"𝜸|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(	𝛽𝑇" + 𝑿4"𝜸|𝑇 = 0) 
= 𝛽 + 𝐸(𝑿4"𝜸|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑿4"𝜸|𝑇 = 0) 
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The second line indicates that the difference in means the researcher observes amounts to T’s 
impact (𝛽) plus the overall difference across groups with respect to the covariates weighted 
by their effects. Thus the condition that needs to be satisfied for causal attribution is that 
expression (2) below be equal to (or not significantly different from) 0.11 
(2) 𝐸(𝑿4"𝛾|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑿4"𝛾|𝑇 = 0)  
This condition is substantially weaker than requiring each and every covariate to be balanced. 
What is required here is only that the sum of the covariates’ effects on Y produces no 
substantial net difference across groups.12 It has been argued that this weaker condition, 
unlike the stronger one, is likely to hold after randomization in large trials (Fuller 2019, 923). 
                                                        
11 This is the condition needed for attributing the total observed difference in outcome to T. 
Attributing the total observed difference is important for quantifying the causal impact of T. If 
we only aim at justifying that T has some impact, we just need to be justified in the claim that 
the imbalance in covariate is smaller than the total observed difference in outcome (see Fuller 
2019, 920). 
12 This weaker condition is endorsed by Deaton and Cartwright (2018) and (in its dichotomic 
version) by Fuller (2019). But it has been accepted in the program evaluation literature since 
Rubin’s work in the 70’s. 
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Now, in the context of (D), some of the variables in X are directly controlled for. Using our 
example, let us suppose the researcher has data on schooling, age, and gender, but not on 
other variables (e.g., ability, motivation, etc.). And let us distinguish between the covariates 
the researcher observes (𝑿67) and those she does not observe (𝑿89). The expression (2) can 
be decomposed as follows:  
𝐸(𝑿4",67𝜸67|𝑇 = 1) + 𝐸(𝑿′",89𝜸89|𝑇 = 1) − ;𝐸(𝑿4",67𝜸67|𝑇 = 0) + 𝐸<𝑿′",89𝜸89|𝑇 = 0=> 
Because of stratification, 𝑿′",67𝜸67  is the same in both groups (so they are cancelled). In the 
context of (D), then, condition (2) is simplified into (2’): 
(2’) 𝐸(𝑿′",89𝜸89|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑿′",89𝜸89|𝑇 = 0) 
What is required here is only that the sum of the unobserved covariates’ effects on Y 
produces no net difference across groups. In typical randomized studies, some of the main 
covariates (i.e., those that have the largest 𝛾’s) are measured at baseline (thus, they are part of 
𝑿67). As long as this is the case, the condition needed for causal attribution is more likely to 
hold in stratified randomization than in simple randomization. This is because after 
controlling for the main covariates, there are less variables left to produce significant 
imbalance, and those left have less capacity to do so (due to their smaller coefficients).  
What does this entail for our question (D)? The reason for randomizing under scrutiny was 
that it makes imbalance in any given unobserved covariate unlikely. Urbach and Worrall 
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challenged the relevance of that result, and argued against the claim that imbalance in each 
and every unobserved covariate is unlikely. We found, however, that their result is also not 
completely relevant for the validity of causal inference. Thus, their result does not challenge 
the virtues of randomization. Instead, what is relevant and correct is that randomizing makes 
significant imbalance in (2) unlikely (in large trials), and that stratified randomization makes 
significant imbalance in (2) even more unlikely. Nevertheless, although relevant for the 
assessment of the virtues of randomization, this is not immediately relevant for (D). For all 
we know, the alternative to randomization gives the same result. In order to answer (D), we 
need to assess comparative arguments—arguments that directly discuss the merits of 
randomization versus its alternative. 
5. The Comparative Argument. 
What is striking in the literature is that very little discussion has been given to what exactly is 
the alternative to randomization when asking (D).13 If the question is what is the specific 
value of randomizing, knowing the alternative to randomization seems key. Urbach (1985) is 
pretty much the only source that mentions some specific alternatives to randomizing. It is 
worth quoting him at length. 
                                                        
13 Senn (2013, 1448) shares this concern. 
 
 17 
[T]here is no reason to think that [unobserved covariates] would balance out more 
effectively between the groups by using a physical randomizing device rather than by 
employing any other method. In short, it seems reasonable to use any method of 
distributing subjects to different treatment groups, provided that there is no evidence 
that the selection procedure will produce unbalanced groups. (1985, 267) 
[I]t should be noted that a randomized design is not the only, or even the best, way of 
instilling confidence that the trial was free from unconscious experimenter bias. The 
same result could be got by insisting on the allocation being done by a person without 
any axe to grind or by one who has no ability or knowledge to exercise a prejudice. 
For example, in a medical trial the selection of patients might be entrusted to an 
independent, non-medical person, or it might be performed according to the order in 
which they present themselves, or by whether their hair is parted on the left or the 
right, or one could simply permit the subjects to choose their own groups, always 
ensuring of course that they have not been informed of which treatment is to be 
applied to which group. (1985, 271) 
The alternative to randomization Urbach suggests is using what I will call an unsuspicious 
variable (U, for short). A U is a variable, not randomly generated, about which the researcher 
has no positive evidence that it will produce baseline imbalance. Urbach argues that it is not 
the case that we should randomize, because any U is as good as randomizing (Worrall 
follows him here; see 2007, 463). Urbach sometimes claims something stronger—that 
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randomization is not “even always the best way of constructing the treatment groups in a 
clinical trial” (Howson and Urbach 2006, 259). 
From a Bayesian perspective, clarifies Urbach, what matters for causal inference in this 
context is that alternative hypotheses are ruled out (1985, 260-270; Howson and Urbach 
2006, 255-259). We are interested in the hypothesis that T has a positive effect on Y in the 
study population (hypothesis H). When, in our running example, we observe a substantive 
difference in income across experimental groups (evidence E), the degree to which E 
corroborates H depends on how well alternative hypotheses explain E and how likely those 
alternative hypotheses are. Thus, if we suspect that, say, education is unbalanced enough to 
make (2) differ from 0 significantly, H does not receive much support from E. This is 
because E is also explained by the imbalance in (2) produced by education. Had we 
controlled for education, then, education could not explain E. Controlling for each suspected 
covariate makes it the case that E strongly supports the hypothesis that the treatment affects 
income, since no other suspected cause could have played a role. This is the Bayesian 
rationale for having all suspected covariates balanced. “In this approach,” concludes Urbach, 
“there is no advantage to be gained from allotting patients … by some physical stochastic 
process. Any method of allocation is satisfactory, so long as we have no reason to think that 
it will have a material influence on the outcome of the experiment” (1985, 270). 
Using this reasoning, both authors downplay the relevance for (D) of the argument that 
randomization controls for what they call “unconscious experimenter bias” or “selection 
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bias.” If the alternative to randomizing is (not a U, but) just physicians choosing who gets 
treatment and who does not, Urbach and Worrall acknowledge that unconscious desires to 
benefit patients can lead to unbalanced groups (Urbach 1985, 270-1; Howson and Urbach 
2005, 258; Worrall 2002, S324-5). Randomization, they agree, can be a useful way of 
avoiding this situation. However, any U does the trick. So, the fact that randomization 
controls for selection bias gives us no specific reason to randomize in (D). 
Summing up, Urbach and Worrall conclude that there is no advantage to be gained from 
randomizing—thus, that it is not the case that we should randomize—by arguing that any U 
is as good as randomizing when it comes to attributing causality. There are, I believe, two 
flaws here. First, the main premise is incorrect—as argued in section (6), it is not true that 
any U is as good as randomizing for causal inference. Second, even granting the premise the 
conclusion does not follow. Imagine that any U is as good as randomizing for causal 
inference in (D), in the sense that both warrant a causal attribution. It does not follow that 
there are no reasons to randomize: differences in research designs that do not matter for 
inference might still matter for action. This distinction is well-known to Bayesians. Consider 
two researchers that perform the exact same experimental protocol except that one uses an 
optional and the other a non-optional stopping rule. If both obtain the same data, Bayesians 
insist both researchers should draw the same inference. As Steele (2013) shows, however, 
this does not entail that the Bayesian is indifferent between choosing an optional versus a 
non-optional stopping rule. Thus, no difference for inference does not entail no difference for 
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action. In sections (6) and (7) I provide reasons researchers have for randomizing, reasons 
that hold even if we were to grant Urbach and Worrall’s claim that any U is as good as 
randomizing for inference. 
6. Randomization is more reliable. 
I will now argue that randomization is a more reliable process for assigning subjects to 
experimental groups than using any U. That is, randomization is less prone to form 
unbalanced groups. This is a good reason for choosing randomization over U, and so it 
directly challenges Urbach and Worrall’s conclusion. Moreover, against Urbach and 
Worrall’s main premise, I will also argue (later in this section) that randomization makes a 
difference for inference. 
In which sense is randomization less prone to failure? I think there are two main ways in 
which an assignment method might fail in a particular instance. First, as discussed above, 
even if we assemble the experimental groups using a variable that is not systematically 
related to covariates, we might get baseline imbalance in our trial just by pure bad luck. This 
holds for randomization, but also for any U. A variable is unsuspicious for a researcher only 
because the researcher has no reason to think there is a systematic relation (present in 
general, beyond the study population) between the U and Y’s covariates. To use Urbach’s 
example, perhaps we do not expect the variable whether-their-hair-is-parted-on-the-left-or-
the-right to correlate in general with any significant covariate of, say, wages. However, even 
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if we are correct, we might be “unlucky,” so that in our particular study population they 
happen to correlate. Just like with randomization, using a U does not guarantee a non-
systematic (due to pure bad luck) connection that is enough to produce baseline imbalance in 
the study population. So, with respect to this first way of failing, there is a tie. 
The second way in which an assignment method might fail in a particular instance is when 
there is a systematic connection between the assignment variable and Y’s covariates. I can 
think of two plausible mechanisms triggering this failure when using a U. First, the 
researcher for whom a variable is unsuspicious (say, the second and third character of a 
subject’s surname), may be ignorant of the fact that this variable is systematically related to 
some covariates. Our researcher conducting the job training evaluation in India, plausibly, 
say, from Boston, might just not know that Indian surnames relate to caste divisions (within 
areas). Urbach’s argument implies that this researcher has no reason to prefer randomization 
over using names. This seems controversial enough. But Urbach’s conclusion holds even if 
the researcher knows that she is not familiar with how names in India are formed. As long as 
she has “no evidence that the selection procedure will produce unbalanced groups” (which, 
presumably, she won’t have if she knows little about Indian surnames), according to Urbach, 
she has no reason to randomize instead of using a U. In contrast, it seems plain that this 
researcher has a strong reason to randomize: her U might be systematically related with some 
unobserved covariates, which would make imbalance in those covariates very likely in the 
study population, thus threatening baseline balance. And this risk is not one she runs with 
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randomization. A random generated number is, in a sense, designed and created for not being 
systematically related to anything that could be a covariate in a study.  
You may think this is not a strong enough reason for researchers who know (and know that 
they know) many details about a particular U. Perhaps these researchers would not use, say, 
the parted-hair variable: although it is a U for them, they know nothing about what drives 
variations of it. They will rather choose a U they are knowledgeable about. It is true that 
choosing U is less risky for these knowledgeable researchers than for the ignorant-about-U-
researcher. But the larger point still holds for them—the possibility of failure due to 
ignorance of a systematic relation remains, whereas it is not present for these knowledgeable 
researchers if they randomize. So they also have a reason to prefer randomization.  
Importantly, this way of failing is not a mere theoretical possibility, but something that 
happens in science. I cannot provide straightforward examples because I know of no 
interventional study that used a U instead of randomizing (which is, perhaps, telling of the 
issue at stake). However, there are examples where a particular variable was thought to play 
a role in an observational study analogous to what a U would play in an interventional study, 
and then (later on) shown to be correlated in general with covariates. I illustrate with 
observational studies that use the instrumental variable method for causal attribution.  
Imagine I am interested in the impact that years of schooling (T) have on wages (Y). The 
problem I face has already been explained: those with more schooling differ in other 
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(observed and unobserved) characteristics. We can control for the observed characteristics, 
but not for the unobserved ones. What the instrumental variable method proposes is the 
following. If you find another variable (Z) that affects T and does not affect Y by a route 
other than T, then you can use Z to estimate the causal impact of T on Y (see details in 
Angrist and Pischke 2009). More specifically, for Z to be a valid instrumental variable, Z 
must have no effect on Y other than the one it has through T, nor be correlated with other 
unobserved covariates of Y. That is, conditional on the value of T, Y has to be independent of 
Z. Here we see the connection with U: Z has to be a variable that, when used to compose 
groups for comparison, produces groups that differ on T but do not differ in other covariates 
of Y. Thus, when a researcher believes that a variable is a Z, that variable is a U for that 
researcher. Of course, the researcher might be wrong about it being a Z. 
There are many instances in which researchers thought a variable was a Z and they were then 
proved wrong. For one, Angrist and Krueger (1991) famously thought they had found a Z for 
estimating the impact of schooling on wages in the US—the quarter of birth. Because of laws 
regarding compulsory age for schooling, quarter of birth and schooling years are related in 
the US population. This, and the belief that quarter of birth is not related to other covariates 
of wages, led Angrist and Krueger to believe that quarter of birth is a good instrument for 
schooling. Thus, for them, quarter of birth was a U. Importantly, many other reputed 
researchers thought this as well (see Buckles and Hungerman 2013, 711). Alas, two decades 
later, Buckles and Hungerman (2013) showed that the season of birth is not as orthogonal to 
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covariates as one would require it to be for the instrumental variable strategy to work. 
Plainly, we are not talking of mere theoretical possibilities here. 
A second plausible mechanism is unconscious (also called “implicit”) bias. A researcher 
might consciously consider a variable as a U, but this might just be that she is not aware of 
the reasons she had for picking it. The researcher, for instance, might think to herself that the 
time subjects arrived at the survey center is uncorrelated with any covariate, making that 
variable a U. However, she might be unaware that her preference for this variable derives in 
fact from her wanting to ‘give a good chance to the study,’ and thinking this variable 
indicates punctuality, an attribute which might be important for the treatment to have any 
effect. In such cases, of course, the researcher would be choosing an allocation method that, 
though unsuspicious for her, is systematically related to unobserved covariates (punctuality). 
Just like with ignorance, this risk is not run with randomization. 
How relevant is this consideration? Bear in mind that I’m not imputing to the researcher a 
conscious intent to rig the study. This is only about implicit bias. And it would be hard today 
to think of implicit biases as something too uncommon to consider (Brownstein and Saul 
2016). If the question at stake, (D), is meant for us (non-ideal epistemic agents), this 
possibility of failing is relevant. 
Randomization, then, is more reliable in the following sense. There are two ways in which an 
assignment method might fail in a particular instance. Both randomizing and using a U are 
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susceptible to the first way, namely, getting baseline imbalance just by pure bad luck. The 
other way is researchers picking a U that systematically relates to some unobserved 
covariates—due to ignorance or unconscious bias. This connection makes imbalance in those 
covariates in the study population very likely. Since this risk arises only by using a U—
whereas the risk of getting baseline imbalance by pure bad luck is common across methods—
researchers have a strong reason to choose randomization over using a U. Whatever the 
probability of wrongly believing there is balance (and to that extent attributing causation) 
when the only risk is that of pure bad luck, it can only increase by choosing a U versus 
randomization. 
So far we have directly challenged Urbach and Worrall’s overall conclusion—we found a 
reason for choosing to randomize. What about their premise, that any U is as good as 
randomizing for inferring causation?14 The degree to which E confirms H depends on the 
plausibility of alternative hypotheses. The less likely the alternative hypotheses, the more E 
confirms H. That is why, Howson and Urbach insist, “the chief concern when designing a 
clinical trial should be to make it unlikely that the experimental groups differ on factors that 
are likely to affect the outcome” (2006, 259 their emphasis). One general alternative 
hypothesis, H*, says: (2’) is sufficiently larger than 0 due to an unbalanced distribution of 
some unobserved covariates or others. 
                                                        
14 I thank a referee for suggestions here. 
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Randomization, I argued above (Section 4), makes H* unlikely (in large trials). More 
importantly for comparative claims, however, this section’s argument entails that H* is more 
plausible if the assignment is made with a U than with randomization: (2’) might be 
sufficiently larger than 0 due to a systematic connection with unobserved covariates (about 
which researchers are ignorant, or consciously unaware). In contrast, learning that the 
allocation was randomized gives us evidence against H* by ruling out some of the 
mechanisms that could produce baseline imbalance (namely, any systematic connection). 
Since H* is more plausible under a U, E confirms H to a lesser degree under a U. Thus, it is 
not true, even by Bayesian lights, that any U is as good as randomizing for causal inference. 
To be clear, this conclusion is comparative—E does confirm H under a U, but to a lesser 
degree than with randomization. Now, we can say something more fine-grained here, and in 
this way start developing a unified framework for assessing the quality of studies with 
regards to balance. How much of a difference does randomization versus a U make? This 
depends on how plausible H* is under the particular U. Arguably, not all U’s are equal. 
Following Urbach, we defined U as a variable, not randomly generated, about which 
researchers have no positive evidence that it will produce baseline imbalance. But absence of 
positive evidence about imbalance is compatible with different amounts of evidence (or 
theoretical reasons) for balance. As hinted above, somebody ignorant about the particular U 
may have no reason to think that groups are unbalanced when subjects are assigned by that 
U. But this lack of reason, mostly driven by ignorance, should not generate ample confidence 
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in the assignment. In contrast, somebody knowledgeable about the particular U, who knows 
about its causes and effects, can reject some mechanisms linking U and covariates of Y. This 
knowledge gives her some reason to be more confident in assigning subjects according to 
that U—she knows that her lack of evidence about U’s connection with covariates is not due 
to a general lack of evidence in the matter.15 In this way, by ruling out mechanisms linking U 
and covariates of Y, H* becomes less plausible and H better confirmed.  
Take an extreme (and impossible) case for illustration—somebody who knows everything 
about a U. In particular, someone who knows how that variable varies in the overall 
population with any covariate of Y. This person, then, knows that the variable at stake is not 
systematically correlated with Y’s covariates (otherwise it would not be a U). She is in the 
same epistemic position with that U as with randomizing—in both cases a systematic 
connection between the variable used for assigning subjects and covariates of Y can be 
rejected. Thus, for this imagined researcher E confirms H equally under U than under 
randomization. The upshot should be clear: the more researchers know about a U, the less of 
a difference randomization makes for them. Still, as argued, for real-life researchers, 
                                                        





randomizing should make even the very knowledgeable researcher more confident in the 
assignment. 
Since one of the goals of this paper is to (partially) conciliate practitioners and philosophers 
of science, I close this section showing how my arguments help reduce some of the current 
disagreement regarding the value of randomization. I focus on two positions by practitioners 
that philosophers of science (partly influenced by Urbach and Worrall’s arguments) have 
criticized. First, it is not difficult to see among some practitioners a general suspiciousness 
about observational studies. Second, in some areas, researchers show almost a fixation with 
randomization, to the point that they seem to consider randomization necessary for 
(statistical) causal inference. Both Urbach (1985; Howson and Urbach 2006) and Worrall 
(2002, 2007) quote several researchers exemplifying these attitudes. 
For starters, note that it is common practice to estimate causal impacts from observational 
studies in social science. Even those scientists best known for their randomization activism 
conduct observational studies where they attribute causation (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2010, Duflo 
2004). Several research designs have been developed for this purpose—instrumental 
variables, differences-in-differences, regression discontinuity design, etc. (see Angrist and 
Pischke 2009).16 All these methods aim to make the case for valid causal inference, and the 
                                                        
16 Though widely taught in econometrics courses, these methods have not been systematically 
used in biomedical research (Deaton and Cartwright 2018, 17). 
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above discussion clarifies how they make that case. Observational studies make a good case 
when the variable that accounts for the distribution of subjects across comparison groups is a 
U more or less well-understood. To illustrate with a previous example, what researchers have 
to argue in order to make a good case, is that quarter of birth is uncorrelated with other 
unobserved covariates of income. This argument usually draws from empirical evidence—for 
example, showing a lack of correlation between quarter of birth and many observed 
covariates of income, performing so-called “over-identification tests” (French and Popovici 
2011)—and theoretical reasons (e.g., the factors thought to affect quarter of birth are not 
thought to affect income).  
Where, then, is the general suspicion coming from? The suspiciousness has, in many cases, 
little to do with dogmatism, 17 and much to do with the fact that many observational studies 
fail to make a good case for comparability. Due to scarcity of data, and thus the inability to 
                                                        
17 For a clear expression of non-dogmatism from authors well-known for their endorsement of 
randomization, here are Angrist and Pischke: “[Edward Leamer] also argued that randomized 
experiments differ only in degree from nonexperimental evaluations of causal effects, the 
difference being the extent to which we can be confident that the causal variable of interest is 
independent of confounding factors. We couldn’t agree more.” (2010, 6) They then add: 
“Indeed, we would be the first to admit that a well-done observational study can be more 
credible and persuasive than a poorly executed randomized trial.” (9) 
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control for covariates, many such studies provide few empirical or theoretical reasons to be 
confident in the assignment (see French and Popovici 2011). Nevertheless, this 
suspiciousness should (and does) decrease when the variable that accounts for the 
distribution of subjects across comparison groups is a U more or less well-understood. 
Indeed, observational studies that make a good case that groups are comparable are 
continuously published in top journals (e.g., Duflo 2004). 
Regarding the second type of disagreement, the crucial point to note is the following. For 
some of the questions in which researchers are interested, background knowledge strongly 
suggests that a good case for causal inference is not forthcoming using observational data. 
This occurs when background knowledge strongly suggests the presence of imbalance in 
covariates that typically are unobservable. A classic example: economists’ reluctance to 
attribute differences in income between participants and non-participants in job training 
programs to the programs even after controlling for education, age, and gender. This 
reluctance is not due to a blind fixation with randomization. Rather, economic theory 
suggests there are reasons why some took the program and others did not. Economists expect 
a systematic connection between participation and unobserved covariates even after having 
controlled for observable variables. First, people more eager to get a job (more “motivated”) 
are likely to be over-represented among the participants. Moreover, according to economic 
theory, those who took the program are more likely to be those who believe they would 
benefit the most from taking it. If this expectation of a larger benefit is correct on average, or 
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if having this expectation is correlated with unobserved covariates (like ability, motivation, 
family networks, etc.), then researchers have further positive reasons for not attributing the 
whole difference to the program.  
All said, it is background theory (e.g., about people’s decision-making processes), and not an 
unwarranted belief in “the special power of randomization” (Worrall 2002, S319), which 
drives (in many cases) researchers’ apparent fixation for randomized studies. That is why 
when background theory suggests the absence of a systematic connection, researchers (even 
well-known “randomistas”) go on and draw causal inferences from good quality 
observational studies. This point was largely missed by Urbach and Worrall’s discussion, 
and, with it, the opportunity to better conciliate research practice with sound epistemological 
principles. 
7. Further Reasons for Randomizing. 
Even if we were to grant Urbach and Worrall’s premise that any U is as good as randomizing 
for causal inference, there are further reasons in favor of randomizing in (D). 
7.1 Epistemic Reason: Rational Stability 
One such reason lies in the stability of our rational beliefs. Randomizing fares better in this 
regard in two ways. First, there is a difference between rationally assigning a credence of ½ 
to the proposition that a coin will come out tails because (i) I have no reason to think that the 
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coin is biased versus (ii) I have good evidence that it is fair. The difference is not seen in the 
credence—either way is ½. It is seen in how I should rationally react to further evidence. 
Learning that the coin landed tails in each of a good number of consecutive tosses should 
have a greater impact on my credence in the case of (i) than in the case of (ii). That is, in (ii), 
my credence is more “resilient” (Skyrms 1977). 
Something somewhat analogous seems to hold with respect to a U versus randomization. 
Neither way of assigning subjects gives me a reason to think that one group is better 
endowed in terms of covariates than the other. In the case of a U, this is because I don’t have 
reasons to think the groups are unbalanced. As discussed above, not all U’s are equal, and 
some will make me more rationally confident about baseline balance. But in real-life cases, 
none will make me as confident as randomization. In this sense, my (rational) causal 
attribution will be more resilient, and thus more stable, with randomization. In particular, 
further evidence questioning the causal attribution (e.g., a contradictory result observed 
afterwards) should make me react more if I used a U than if I randomized. 
A second reason why randomization produces more stability is as follows. If we use a U, 
there is a kind of undercutting evidence that can be presented to us and that, if presented, will 
force us to withdraw the causal attribution: evidence that the variable used is systematically 
correlated with a significant covariate of Y. This is what happened with the case of quarter of 
birth—further evidence showed it to vary systematically with significant covariates. Because 
random numbers are not systematically correlated with significant covariates, no such 
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evidence can be provided if we randomize. Moreover, it is not only empirical evidence that 
can be presented to us and that may lead us to withdraw the causal attribution when using a 
U. Theoretical arguments might be developed later on, arguments which suggest that the U at 
stake is systematically correlated with covariates of Y. Again, this is not something that can 
occur if we randomize. We have found, then, a second way in which our causal attribution 
will be more stable if we randomize—not because of the resilience of our credences towards 
rebutting evidence (as before), but because of the difference in potential undercutting 
evidence (or theoretical reasons) regarding baseline balance. 
Randomizing may produce more rational stability than using a U through the two 
mechanisms mentioned. Arguably, rational stability is important. When knowledge guides 
action, it is in the agent’s interest that such guidance is more (rationally) stable, more robust 
to new evidence. The action referred to might well be intellectual (e.g., decisions about 
further research), or practical. When political institutions request scientific reports on 
controversial policy topics, what they are looking for is valuable information. This surely 
includes information that is trustworthy, in the sense that (i) the opinion roughly reflects the 
scientific consensus, but also (ii) in the sense that it is stable, that it is unlikely to change 
(unless surprising new evidence is collected). Why wouldn’t scientists choose a method of 
assignment that makes their rational conclusions more stable? 
7.2 Epistemic Reason: Rational Agreement. 
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Is there any further reason that a community of researchers might have for asking each 
researcher to randomize, which is, perhaps, not immediately a reason for the individual 
researcher? Take the case of our job-training researcher, and imagine she assigns subjects 
according to a variable (call it V). V is a U for that researcher. There might be another 
researcher within the same field that disagrees—V is not a U for her. This second researcher 
thinks that subjects for which V=1 (versus those for which V=0) systematically differ in 
relevant unobserved covariates, and thus that assigning subjects according to V makes 
condition (2’) unlikely to hold. This could be because the second researcher just knows more 
about V, in which case it is a bad thing for science that the first researcher chose to use V 
instead of randomizing. But the disagreement can also be due to differences in rational 
beliefs the two researchers have about V’s possible relations to some covariates of Y. That is, 
not due to the second researcher knowing that V is systematically related to some covariates, 
but rationally believing so.18 This rational disagreement, however, cannot occur if the first 
researcher randomized. Nobody has a reason to believe that the random variable used to 
assign subjects is systematically related to some covariates.  
Since rational agreement and consensus among scientists seems highly valuable, we found a 
collective reason for randomizing: The community should ask the individual researcher to 
                                                        
18 Disagreement of this kind is not a mere theoretical possibility, but rather a common feature 
of research communities. For examples in economics, see French and Popovici (2011). 
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randomize even if there is another variable that she considers to be a U, since some 
colleagues might not (rationally) agree. Randomizing reduces for the community, without 
cost, disagreement that comes from researchers’ different takes on potential U’s.19 
7.3 Non-epistemic Reasons. 
For completeness, I briefly discuss non-epistemic reasons for randomizing in (D). Part of 
Urbach’s and Worrall’s criticisms of randomized studies relate to well-known ethical and 
pragmatic considerations. As mentioned above, though valid and important, these criticisms 
do not bear on (D). In contrast, there are other ethical and pragmatic reasons—relevant in 
(D)—in favor of randomizing. 
Pragmatically speaking, researchers will not always have potential U’s in their database. 
They could collect them, but generating a random number is less costly. Some variables that 
researchers usually have that might potentially be considered U’s are not straightforwardly 
unsuspicious. Names, for instance, can be correlated with socioeconomic status (in our 
example above). The time at which the subject arrived at the survey center can be correlated 
with punctuality—hardly a variable one wants unbalanced in a job training program 
evaluation. And so on. Thus, U is not always a feasible (not costlier) alternative. 
                                                        
19 This argument draws from (Suppes 1982; La Caze 2013). 
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On the ethics side, the literature has discussed the moral value of using lotteries for political 
decisions for some decades. As Stone (2010) argues, standard arguments for using lotteries 
only show that random selection is as good as “picking”—selecting an option for no 
particular reason. For instance, if the alleged reason to select randomly is that all the options 
are equally good (or bad) according to the relevant criteria, then random selection provides 
no benefit over picking. However, there are cases in which we have a reason to prefer 
random selection over picking. These are cases where fairness is at stake. The contrasting 
position is presented here by Elster, in the context of a physician who has to allocate organ 
transplants in accordance with need and faces the question of how to allocate them once need 
has already been considered. 
To say that we might as well use a lottery is not to say, however, that a lottery is 
rationally or morally required. If there is no detectable, relevant difference among the 
candidates, all are equally worthy and hence it might appear that no wrong is done by 
using other methods of allocation. Thus it has been argued that one might as well 
select the most beautiful, the ugliest, the tallest (and presumably the shortest) people 
in the pool. (1989, 109) 
Stone (2010, 154) correctly rejects that random allocation is not morally preferable here. 
Assigning according to beauty violates the impartiality requirement of justice. Justice is not 
exhausted by taking good reasons into account (need, in this case). It also requires avoiding 
bad reasons (beauty). This holds for interventional studies also—whenever a U embodies bad 
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moral reasons (such as when U=beauty), researchers have a moral reason to use 
randomization over a U. 
A further moral reason for randomizing over using a U: it is preferable to choose a method 
that subjects perceive as fairer. Subjects might perceive randomization as fairer than 
entrusting the assignment to, say, “a person without any axe to grind.” This might be because 
U embodies a morally bad reason, or merely because subjects distrust more assignments 
made with non-random variables. Indeed, this perceived-fairness factor is considered by 
practitioners20. This is why researchers sometimes do the randomized assignment publicly. In 
short, as long as the subjects perceive as fairer a random assignment, researchers have a 
moral reason to randomize in (D).  
In sum, assigning by a U may be unjust or be perceived as unjust by the subjects relative to 
randomization. In any of these two cases, researchers have a moral reason to randomize. 
Granted, these considerations about justice and perceived fairness might not apply in all 
cases—some treatments in the social sciences are not significant enough to trigger justice 
concerns, and some researchers might happen to have available U’s for which subjects have 
                                                        
20 See David McKenzie’s blog: https://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/should-we-




no fairness complaint. Nevertheless, it seems to me, these considerations would apply in 
many cases. 
8. Conclusion. 
Pace Urbach and Worrall’s insistence that, after controlling for observed covariates, 
randomizing can do “no further epistemic good” (Worrall 2007, 463) and thus that “there’s 
no cause to randomize,” I have provided epistemic (and non-epistemic) reasons to prefer 
randomizing over its alternative, U, in interventional studies. Moreover, the greater reliability 
of randomization over U for achieving baseline balance provides a sound justification to the 
current practice of giving a positive value to randomization when assessing studies. This 
does not entail rejecting observational studies’ capacity to achieve baseline balance, and thus 
to warrant causal inference. When assessing studies, evidence-appraisers need to judge how 
plausible the alternative hypothesis H* is, given what we know of the way the comparison 
groups were formed. When comparison groups are formed by a U about which we 
understand little (well), the alternative hypothesis H* is more (less) plausible, which 
decreases (increases) the quality of the causal evidence. And, when background knowledge 
strongly suggests there is a systematic connection between being in one comparison group 
and unobserved covariates of Y, ceteris paribus, observational studies provide little 
justification for causal attribution. Thus, not all observational studies are on a par with 
regards to baseline balance. This more nuanced and unified view on baseline balance 
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provides a better framework for developing evidence-appraisal tools that do not treat all non-
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